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Abstract— A flight simulation study was conducted at 
NASA Langley Research Center to evaluate flight deck systems 
that (1) predict aircraft energy state and/or autoflight 
configuration, (2) present the current state and expected future 
state of automated systems, and/or (3) show the state of flight-
critical data systems in use by automated systems and primary 
flight instruments.  
Four new technology concepts were evaluated vis-à-vis 
current state-of-the-art flight deck systems and indicators. This 
human-in-the-loop study was conducted using commercial 
airline crews. Scenarios spanned a range of complex conditions 
and several emulated causal factors and complexity in recent 
accidents involving loss of state awareness by pilots (e.g. energy 
state, automation state, and/or system state). 
Data were collected via questionnaires administered after 
each flight, audio/video recordings, physiological data, head 
and eye tracking data, pilot control inputs, and researcher 
observations. This paper strictly focuses on findings derived 
from the questionnaire responses. It includes analysis of pilot 
subjective measures of complexity, decision making, workload, 
situation awareness, usability, and acceptability.  
Keywords—Energy, automation, system, complexity, decision 
making, usability, workload, situation awareness, acceptability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Automation and Information Management Experiment 
(AIME) was conducted at NASA Langley Research Center 
to evaluate flight deck systems that (1) predict aircraft 
energy state and/or autoflight configuration, (2) present the 
current state and expected future state of automated systems, 
and/or (3) show the state of flight-critical data systems in 
use by automated systems and primary flight instruments. 
Four new flight deck display concepts/technologies were 
evaluated vis-à-vis a representative baseline of current state-
of-the-art flight deck systems and indicators.  
AIME was conducted over several weeks from 
November 2015 to January 2016 using 11 commercial 
airline crews. Each crew completed on average 20 flight 
scenarios over two days in the flight simulator. In total, over 
220 flights were completed. 
Several types of data were recorded during each flight 
including aircraft state parameters, audio, video, and 
physiological measures (electrocardiogram, respiration, skin 
conductance). After each flight, each pilot completed a 
subjective measures questionnaire. A summary debrief was 
conducted at the end of the second day for each crew. 
This paper focuses on the analysis of the questionnaire 
responses pertaining to complexity, decision making, 
workload, situation awareness, usability, and acceptability. 
Representative observations derived from pilot comments 
on the new technology concepts are also included. For a 
broader view of AIME, including motivation, purpose, and 
results not presented here, see [1], [2], and [3]. 
II. TECHNOLOGIES UNDER EVALUATION 
In this experiment, five display conditions were used. 
Boeing 787-like flight deck displays and indicators served 
as a reference or baseline (BL) condition. The other four 
conditions were new technology concepts that augmented 
this baseline. All five included the following displays: 
 Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Head-Up Display 
(HUD) 
 Navigation Display (ND) and Vertical Situation Display 
(VSD) 
 Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) 
 Synoptics displays  
 Lower MFD (LMFD), serving primarily as the pilot 
interface to the Flight Management System (FMS) 
 ATC communications display  
 Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) 
 
These displays were organized in a B-787-like layout as 




Fig. 1. AIME flight deck display layout. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160012243 2019-08-29T17:28:54+00:00Z
The four new technology concepts evaluated were: 
 ME - Maneuver Envelope display and effects estimation 
function; information provided on the PFD  
 TP - Trajectory Prediction function; information 
provided on the VSD and ND 
 SIS - System Interaction Synoptic; information provided 
as an additional tab on the Synoptics display, with 
associated simplified checklists on the EFBs 
 PAE - Predictive Alerting of Energy-related problems; 
information provided on EICAS, ND, and VSD 
These new indicators and functions, as implemented for 
AIME, are described in [1], [2], and [3]. Figures 2 through 6 
provide examples of the display elements. 
ME estimates and monitors the maneuvering envelop of 
the aircraft and provides visual awareness of the changing 
relationship between airspeed, bank angle, angle of attack, 
and lift via maneuverability bands (amber and red/black 
segments) that dynamically update in flight. The bands are 
shown on the airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator, 
and bank angle indicator. For more on ME see [4]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example ME Indicators on the PFD. 
 
TP predicts where the auto-flight system will take the 
aircraft and where mode changes will occur if the pilot were 
to make no additional inputs. It indicates this as a green line 
on the VSD and ND, with a constant length of five minutes. 
Green circles, labeled with the mode change, indicate where 
mode changes are predicted to occur. The white line (see 
Fig. 3) is not part of TP, but predicts where the aircraft will 
go based on inertia and is standard functionality on B-787-
like displays. Pilot inputs (e.g. extending speedbrakes or 
changing commanded airspeed) cause these indicators to 
change based on new predictions. For more on TP see [5]. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example TP indications on VSD; predicting ALT 
hold transition near CADUS. 
SIS graphically depicts whether flight-critical data is 
valid, the state of the sources of the data, and the effect on 
systems that receive the data should a relevant failure occur. 
It supplements checklists by providing information in a 
graphical form that would otherwise typically be given as 
textual “notes” in the checklists. For AIME, the relevant 
standard non-normal checklists were shortened to remove 
this information, which was now conveyed by SIS. For 
more information on SIS see [1] and [2]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Example SIS indications for air data system failure. 
 
PAE provides predictive information related to where 
energy-related problems will occur if the current course of 
action is continued. The prediction is indicated as a cyan 
circle and label on the TP-generated green line. In 
conjunction with any predicted condition, an EICAS 
message states the type of energy-related problem being 
predicted. A triangle in front of the EICAS message 
indicates a predicted condition, not one that has already 




Fig. 5. Example PAE indication on EICAS; predicting high 
and fast on approach. 
 
Fig. 6. Example PAE indications on the VSD; predicting 
high and fast on approach (ENERGY label and symbol). 
 
ME and TP are the result of previous research and have a 
higher Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The SIS and 
PAE technology concepts are less mature, with AIME being 
the first opportunity for testing against design requirements 
and assessed for usability by pilots.  
III. EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
A. Test Subjects 
 Eleven two-pilot airline crews participated. Each crew 
spent two days on-site and consisted of a Captain and First 
Officer from the same airline. Type ratings covered Boeing 
787, 777, 767, 757, 747, 737, and Airbus 330, 321, 320, 
319. Flight experience ranged from 5,000 to 39,000 hours, 
with an average of 15,500 hours. 
 
B. Scenarios 
Six types of scenarios were defined for AIME:  
1. Nominal 
2. Loss of flight-critical data 
3. Increased risk of low energy 
4. Increased risk of high energy 
5. Unanticipated automation interaction required 
6. Distractions affecting workload management 
 
Specifics for these are summarized in Table I. Types 2 – 
6 include off-nominal events. Off-nominal events were 
included to help expose state awareness issues and/or to 
mimic relevant accidents/incidents. This resulted in 20 
unique scenarios to draw from for the run sequence for each 
crew. The flight time for each scenario was on the order of 
15-20 minutes, followed by the administration of 
questionnaires with a web-based tool developed for this 
experiment. Weather cases (Wx) in Table I are coded as: 
 
0. VMC, Ceiling 1000 ft, Visibility 3 miles; Calm; 
Dusk 
1. IMC, Ceiling 500 ft, Visibility 2400 ft; Storm, light 
turbulence and winds; Night 
2. IMC, Ceiling 200 ft, Visibility 1800 ft; Storm, 
moderate turbulence and winds; Night 
3. IMC, Ceiling 100 ft, Visibility 1000 ft; Storm, 
moderate turbulence and winds; Night 
4. Clear-and-visibility ok (CAVOK); Dusk 
TABLE I. AIME SCENARIO SUMMARIES BY TYPE. 
Type Wx Off-nominal(s) 
1 0 None, follow published STARs (KMEM) 
or SID (KDEN), use airline procedures 
2 1,3 (a, b) Failure within the pitot-static 
system due to icing/blockage of the pitot 
and/or static ports, and/or failure of the 
pitot heat system; airspeed and/or altitude 
become unreliable;  
(c, d) IRS, IRU, and/or AHRU fail 
3 0,3 (a) Radar altimeter reports -8 ft at ~2000 
ft after GS captured; causes A/T to go to 
ROLLOUT FLARE mode, returns 
throttles to idle position even if the pilot 
pushes them forward (i.e. A/T remains 
engaged unless pilot disconnects); 
(b) Aircraft in front slows; ATC asks 
ownship to slow to maintain spacing;  
(c) At mid-point between turn-to-final 
and FAF, A/T disconnects;  
(d) ATC issues vectors for ILS approach, 
then “descend to 3000, slow to 180”, after 
“Contact tower” issues “Runway change 
to 18R” (farther parallel runway); after 
A/T retracts to idle, A/T disconnects 
4 0,4 (a) NOTAM: “Glideslope Out of 
Service”; ATC issues clearances that set 
crew up high, then clears for visual 
approach;  
(b) ATC issues two “direct-tos” causing 
crew to be high and fast at 4000 ft, ATC 
says expect runway 36L; but after turn 
onto final, ATC issues clearance to 
parallel (closer) runway; if crew doesn’t 
go around by 300 ft, ATC calls for go-
around; 4-knot tailwind on final approach 
5 0,1,2 (a) Tailwind encountered is significantly 
higher than forecast winds in the FMS, 
causes unexpected VNAV transitions 
during downwind leg; 
(b) After passing 6000 ft, ATC issues 
“Level at 4000, hold at present position”, 
after clearance, A/T disconnects without 
audible annunciation;  
(c) During an RNAV approach, ATC 
calls for unexpected go-around at low 
altitude (~300 ft AGL) 
6 1,2 (a) EICAS message “HYD SYS PRESS 
(CENTER ONLY)” shortly after start; 
later at 3000 ft, ATC issues “Low level 
wind shear, +/- 10 knots, 1000 ft on 
approach to Runway 18C”; 
(b) ANTISKID warning on EICAS after 
start; Use shorter runway, runway 
conditions reported as “poor” 
C. Facilities 
AIME was conducted in the Research Flight Deck 
(RFD) within the Cockpit Motion Facility (CMF) at 
NASA’s Langley Research Center (Figure 7). For AIME, 




Fig. 7. RFD internal (top) and external (bottom). 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSION 
Questionnaires were collected over a testing period of 
several weeks, with more than 220 flights completed. As 
shown in Table II, the total number of questionnaires 
received was 400. For some flights, questionnaires were not 
completed either due to inadequate time, or a connectivity 
issue with the questionnaire tool. Data were collected for 
Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM). Each pilot 
individually completed a questionnaire after each flight. The 
pilots alternated roles periodically so that each pilot 
assumed each role for about half the scenarios. Roles were 
not changed during a flight, only between flights. 
Selected results from the subjective measures are 
presented in the following sections for complexity, decision 
making factors, workload, situation awareness, usability, 
and acceptability. For each of these sets of data, analysis of 
variance was conducted to assess the impact of PF vs PM. 
There was no statistically significant difference between 
means as determined by one-way ANOVA (α = 0.05). 
Therefore no post-hoc statistical tests were performed.  
TABLE II. COMPLETED PILOT QUESTIONNAIRES BY 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
BL 10 36 32 28 40 16 162 
ME 16 0 8 12 18 0 54 
TP 37 0 14 8 18 10 87 
SIS 0 41 0 0 0 0 41 
PAE 0 0 28 22 4 2 56 
Total 63 77 82 70 80 28 400 
  
Comparisons involving PAE were the closest to showing 
statistically significant differences between PF and PM.  
Some scenarios were flown twice by the same crew, 
once with the baseline (BL) technology condition being 
evaluated and once with one of the new technologies being 
evaluated. This occurred 14 times for ME and PAE, 16 for 
SIS, and 18 for TP. Order was randomized. For each “same 
scenario” pair, the difference in score between the evaluated 
technology and baseline was calculated. These score 
differences were then averaged for each technology to show 
the change from baseline. 
 
A. Complexity  
After each flight, pilots rated the complexity of (a) the 
task, (b) the operational environment, (c) the 
system/automation, and (d) the information provided. 
Ratings were based on a scale from 1 (not complex) to 10 
(extremely complex).  Figure 8 shows the mean perceived 
complexity of the task and the operational environment, 
along with +/-2 standard errors (SE) to represent the 
variability in responses.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Complexity by scenario type. 
 
As can be seen, Type 2 scenarios presented the greatest 
complexity. Type 1 scenarios, which had no off-nominal 
events, presented the least. For this graphic, the results for 
PF and PM are combined. These results help to validate the 
scenario designs (e.g. Type 2 was designed to be the most 
complex of all the scenarios). 
Figure 9 shows the mean difference in perceived 
complexity of the system/automation and the information 
provided for the evaluated technologies versus the BL 
condition, based on same-scenario pairwise comparisons.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Difference in system/automation and information 
complexity versus baseline. 
 
Positive values indicate higher perceived complexity for 
the evaluated technology than the baseline (BL). Negative 
values indicate lower complexity than BL. For ME the 
differences from BL are not remarkable, indicating that 
there is minimal perceived effect on clutter. With TP and 
PAE, the complexity of the system/automation and the 
information provided increased from BL for PF and 
decreased for PM. This is particularly encouraging for the 
PM role as reference to these indicators is more in line with 
the monitoring function. With SIS, this form of complexity 
was reduced for PF, and even more so for PM. This 
reinforces the design concept that such graphical 
representations can be more intuitive. 
 
B. Decision Making 
After each flight, pilots were asked to rank the top three 
factors, in order, that most influenced their decisions with 
respect to maintaining safety of flight. The aggregate 
responses for the number one factor are shown in Figure 10. 
The highest ranked decision-making factor across all 
pilots and all flights was flight path management (for both 
PF and PM). Below that was autoflight system state for PF 
and aircraft system state for PM. Communication with ATC 
was ranked first the least.  
Overall the top three factors for maintaining safety of 
flight were: (1) Flight path management, (2) Autoflight 
system state, (3) Energy state / Aircraft system state (tie). 
    
Fig. 10. Number one ranked decision-making factor for 
safety of flight across all BL flights. 
C. State Awareness 
Pilots were asked to indicate which baseline indicators 
they relied on most for awareness of (a) energy state, (b) 
autoflight system state, and (c) aircraft system state. 
Energy state awareness results are shown in Figure 11 
for PF and PM combined. PFD airspeed and altitude were 
the predominant responses, as expected. Lowest ranked 
were EICAS indications, HUD AOA, and audible alerts. 
Perhaps the most striking finding here is the number of 
indicators used by pilots for energy state awareness. The 
average number of indicators checked off by pilots for this 
question was 4.5. Interestingly, aircraft sound and feel was 
cited more often than some of the other indicators, including 
audible alerts. 
 
Fig. 11. Ranking of BL energy state awareness indicators. 
For autoflight system state awareness, the top three 
baseline indicators were, as expected: (1) FMA, (2) MCP, 
and (3) PFD commanded speed. For systems state 
awareness the predominant baseline indicator was EICAS.  
All of this data hints at the dichonomy that exists relative 
to the amount of opaqueness in the design of flight deck 
systems and functions. Energy state is inferred by the pilot 
from a host of information elements; while autoflight system 
state and the state of onboard systems is provided more 
explicitly but with little or no transparency regarding the 
information elements used to generate the state indication.  
 
D. Workload 
Perceived workload was measured two ways: the NASA 
Raw Task Load Index (RTLX) [6] [7] [8] and a four-factor 
assessment.  
RTLX derives an overall workload score based on the 
unweighted average of ratings of six subscales (mental 
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, 
effort, and frustration level). Each subscale rating, except 
performance, is scored on a scale of 0 (very low) to 100 
(very high). Performance is scored on a scale of 0 (perfect) 
to 100 (failure). 
Figure 12 shows the mean differences in perceived 
workload, as measured by RTLX, for the evaluated 
technologies versus baseline based on same-scenario 
pairwise comparisons. Positive values indicate higher 
perceived workload for the new technology vs. baseline. 
Negative values indicate lower perceived workload using 
the new technology. 
 
Fig. 12. Difference in workload vs baseline (RTLX). 
 
Use of ME resulted in a modest increase in workload for 
PF and a slight decrease for PM. For TP, workload 
decreased modestly for PF and very slightly for PM. For 
SIS, workload decreased markedly for PF and PM. For 
PAE, workload increased for PF and decreased for PM. 
These findings are quite consistent with the intended 
functions of these technologies. For example, ME was 
designed to primarily aid the PF. 
A substantial workload decrease was seen for SIS PM. 
This makes sense because the PM sees the greatest 
immediate benefit of SIS, with shortened checklists to work 
through.  A notable workload increase was seen for PAE by 
the PF. PF scored PAE workload higher on each of the six 
RTLX subscales compared with ME, TP, and SIS. This may 
reflect the low TRL of this nascent technology, and the fact 
that crew procedures for the use of PAE were not well-
defined. Feedback from the crews will help to define 
appropriate procedures for future tests as this technology 
matures. 
Workload was also assessed based on pilot ratings of the 
following four factors from 0 (Easier) to 10 (Harder): 
1. My average workload. 
2. My peak workload. 
3. Other crewmember’s average workload. 
4. Other crewmember’s peak workload. 
 
The mean difference in workload for each technology 
versus baseline is shown in Figure 13, again based on same-
scenario pairwise comparisons. Positive scores indicate 
pilots judged workload for the new technology to be higher 
than baseline. Negative scores indicates lower workload for 
the new technology.  
 
 
Fig. 13. Difference in workload vs baseline (Four-Factor). 
Figure 13 shows pilots generally rated their workload 
and their crewmember’s workload lower with the new 
technologies. The exception is PF assessment of increased 
workload with PAE. This is consistent with the RTLX 
results. Notable decreases in workload are seen across the 
scale for SIS. In general the assessment of the other pilot’s 
workload slightly overestimated the actual decrease in 
workload. Also, these results show slightly lower 
assessments of “my workload” than the RTLX results, but 
the assessments of the other crewmember’s workload 
substantially overestimated decreases in workload shown by 
the RTLX results. 
 
E. Situation Awareness  
Situation awareness (SA) was measured by using the SA 
Rating Technique (SART) [9]. The three dimensions of 
SART are (1) Demand on pilot attentional resources, (2) 
Supply of pilot attentional resources, and (3) Understanding 
by the pilot of the situation. Pilots rated Demand, Supply, 
and Understanding after each flight on a scale of 0 (very 
low) to 100 (very high). SA is calculated using SART as: 
     SA = Understanding – (Demand – Supply) 
Figure 14 shows the mean difference in SART scores for 
the evaluated technologies versus baseline based on same-
scenario pairwise comparisons. Positive values indicate 
higher SA for the evaluated technology than for baseline. 
Negative values indicate lower SA than baseline. For PF, 
SA increased using ME, TP, and SIS versus BL but 
decreased using PAE. This reinforces the PF perceived 
workload increase for PAE seen earlier. The PM saw 
increases in SA with TP, SIS, and PAE, while the change in 
SA for ME was essentially flat. Overall, SIS offered 
substantial increase in SA. This corresponds with the 
substantial decrease in workload seen for SIS earlier.  
    
Fig. 14. Change in SA vs Baseline. 
F. Usability 
ISO defines the usability of a system as the extent to 
which it can be used by specified users to achieve specified 
goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction, in a 
specified context of use [10]. The System Usability Scale 
(SUS) questionnaire [11] [12] [13] [14] was used to gauge 
how pilots assessed the perceived usability of ME, TP, SIS, 
and PAE in the context of the scenario just flown. SUS was 
chosen because it offered several benefits. (1) It could be 
administered quickly between flights. (2) It has been shown 
to be valid and reliable. (3) It can provide a good assessment 
of usability even with small sample sizes. (4) Since it was 
introduced in 1986 it has become the most widely used 
questionnaire for measuring perceived usability, with a track 
record of thousands of assessments in many fields. 
Per the SUS method, after each flight the PF and PM 
scored 10 statements for the technology under evaluation:  
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently. 
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex. 
3. I thought the system was easy to use. 
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical 
person to be able to use this system. 
5. I found the various functions in this system were well 
integrated. 
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this 
system. 
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use 
this system very quickly. 
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use. 
9. I felt very confident using the system. 
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going 
with this system. 
 
The 10 statements are arranged such that positive and 
negative statements alternate to encourage the respondent to 
think before responding. Each statement had five Likert 
scale response options ranging from Strongly Agree to 
Strongly Disagree. During post-hoc analysis, SUS scores 
were calculated, producing overall scores for each 
technology. SUS scores can range from 0 to 100, but they 
are not percentile ranks. However, they can be converted to 
percentile ranks. As a way to intuitively interpret SUS 
scores, [15] proposed a correlation between SUS scores and 
letter grades. Based on extensive research [16] showed 
specific letter grades can be associated with corresponding 
SUS score ranges. This mapping is used here to put the SUS 
scores in the context of letter grades.  
Pilot usability scores for ME, TP, SIS, and PAE are 
shown in Figure 15. ME scored an A for usability for both 
PF and PM. TP also rated well, at A- for both PF and PM.  
For the PM, SIS scored an outstanding rating at A+. SIS 
also rated high for the PF, at A-. PAE rated C for both PF 
and PM. Results are shown as mean values, along with +/-2 
SE to represent the variability in responses.  
    
Fig. 15. Usability of ME, TP, SIS, and PAE. 
Within these overall scores, mean scores for the 
individual 10 statements are shown in Figure 15. 
 Fig. 15. SUS statement scores for the new technologies.    
The scores for ME, TP, and SIS are high for the odd 
numbered items and low for the even numbered items, 
indicating good usability – commensurate with the overall 
scores. The scores for PAE are not as high for the odd items 
and not as low for the even items, indicating where more 
work is needed to mature the technology.  
G. Acceptability 
Pilots rated the acceptability of the technologies on a 1 
to 7 scale. Where 
1 = Very unacceptable. I did not like the technology and 
would not use it in normal operations. 
4 = Average. I liked the technology and would use it in 
normal operations, but would like to see some 
improvements. 
7 = Very acceptable. I like the technology very much 
and would use it without any improvements.  
Mean acceptability results are shown in Figure 16, along 
with +/-2 SE to represent the variability in responses. All 
acceptability ratings were found to be above average. The 
highest overall rating is for SIS PM, which also had very 
good results for workload and usability. The acceptability 
rating for PAE is consistent with its usability results and its 
early stage of development; its high variability in responses 
is largely due to performance problems for some of the 
predictors for some of the flights.    
The number of flights used to derive the usability and 
acceptability ratings are shown in Table III. 
Table III. NUMBER OF FLIGHTS FOR USABILITY AND 
ACCEPTABILITY RATINGS. 
ME TP SIS PAE 
PF PM PF PM PF PM PF PM 
27 27 44 44 21 20 29 29 
 
Fig. 16. Acceptability of ME, TP, SIS, and PAE. 
H. Pilot comments 
Discussions between pilots, and between pilots and 
researchers, were held after each run and during the post-
experiment debriefs.  Representative observations are 
paraphrased below for each technology. 
 
ME 
1. … tends to clutter the PFD and block other information 
in some situations. 
2. … if the flight director fails, it could help decide what 
pitch to go to.  
3. … speed bands are more useful than the roll bands.  
4. …the bank angle indications would be much more 
effective as a pop-up feature, when the aircraft comes 
close to exceeding a safe bank angle; would be 
especially helpful during an engine-out scenario.  
5. … would be nice to have when banking at higher 
altitudes. 
6. … a nice situational awareness display that could really 
save the day on a heavyweight takeoff with sharp turn 
during cleanup. 
TP 
1. Several general positive comments (e.g. Awesome; I like 
this thing; Great aid to situational awareness; Would be 
used on a regular basis.) 
2. … be careful not to create clutter. 
3. … need to better distinguish, and train, differences 
between the green line predictor and the white line 
predictor.  
4. … might be better for less experienced pilots who may 
not have seen some of the possible mode changes that 
can occur. 
5. … was good in showing where aircraft will intercept the 
localizer and glide slope. 
6. … provided another place to look besides Flight Mode 
Annunciator for automation states and state changes. 
 
SIS 
1. … the synoptics make it so much better, gives the big 
picture of the situation at a glance. 
2. … like that it pops up and provides the needed 
information. Tells what systems we have and don’t 
have.  
3. … increases SA significantly, and avoids PM becoming 
buried in long checklists.  
4. … need to be careful not to rely solely on this function; 
still need to crosscheck against other information. 
5. … expedites working through otherwise lengthy 
checklists. Allows both pilots to stay in the flight.  
6. … backed up the EICAS message for 100% 
understanding of the malfunction. EICAS only gives a 
title to the problem. This was like opening a book and 
immediately being given the rest of the story to 
understand what exactly the effects were. 
 
PAE 
1. …borders on too much information. 
2. …too many failures or erroneous indications in this 
version to judge utility at the present time. 
3. … phraseology is awkward; "ENERGY" term isn’t 
intuitive. 
4. … indications too small and should come as an aural as 
well. Hard to notice.  
5. …Good system concept but needs more development to 
improve performance and gauge true usability. 
 
SUMMARY 
This paper presents results from questionnaires 
administered to pilots during the Automation and 
Information Management Experiment (AIME). Four new 
flight deck display concepts were evaluated by 11 crews (22 
pilots) with respect to complexity, decision making, 
workload, situation awareness, acceptability, and usability. 
Each was evaluated vis-à-vis current state-of-the-art systems 
and indicators. Flight scenarios spanned a range of 
conditions designed to help expose state awareness issues 
where these technologies were intended to be used/useful. In 
general, SIS showed notable reduction in workload and 
increase in situation awareness. ME, TP, and SIS all ranked 
high for usability and acceptability. PAE ranked average for 
these despite its development state being very preliminary. 
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